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RECORDS OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE SCHOOL OF LAW
LIVE SYMPOSIUM ON JUDICIAL SELECTION
[Editor's Note: The following Records of Proceedings represent portions of a live
symposium that took place on November 8, 2001 at the Old Capitol House of
Representatives Chamber in Jackson, Mississippi. The Mississippi College School
of Law and its Law Review wish to thank the Old Capitol Museum for allowing
the use of its beautiful facilities.]
The Law Review is honored to have had such a distinguished set of speakers and
commentators present at the symposium. For the reader's benefit, those present
were as follows:
* Carl Baar, Professor of Politics at York University;
* Honorable Fred Banks, Former Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court;
* Craig Callen, J. Will Young Professor of Law at the Mississippi College

School

of Law;
* Erwin Chemerinsky, Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal
Ethics, and Political Science at the University of Southern California Law School
* Lino A. Graglia, A. Dalton Cross Professor in Law at the University of Texas
School of Law;
* Arthur D. Hellman, Professor of Law and Distinguished Faculty Scholar at the
University of Pittsburgh School of Law;
* Jeffrey Jackson, Owen Cooper Professor of Law at the Mississippi College
School of Law;
* Jim Kitchens, Esq., partner in the firm of Kitchens and Ellis in Jackson,
Mississippi;
* Phillip McIntosh, Professor of Law at the Mississippi College School of Law;
* Honorable Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Chief Justice of the Mississippi Supreme
Court;
* Leslie Scott, Esq., Assistant Secretary of State for Elections of the Mississippi
Secretary of State's Office;
* Honorable Leslie H. Southwick, Presiding Judge of the Mississippi Court of
Appeals;
* Andy Taggart, Esq., partner in the firm of Butler Snow O'Mara Stevens and
Cannada in Jackson, Mississippi; and
* Governor William E Winter, Former Governor of the State of Mississippi and
partner in the firm of Watkins Ludlam Winter and Stennis in Jackson, Mississippi.
[Special thanks are due to each of the above-listed participants who helped to
make the day's continued discussion a great success.]
Andy Gipson: During the 1840s, President Andrew Jackson stood in this very
room and delivered a speech to those gathered here. Indeed, populist principles
similar to those held by President Jackson have characterized the political climate
of our State for the majority of the State's existence. Thus it is appropriate that we
are gathered here today to revisit those principles and talk about their implications
as they relate to judicial selection, and we are honored that you have chosen to be
present here today to join in this discussion.
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It is a blessing that we are able to gather in this place and express different viewpoints on the issue, as we seek to engage in an even-handed discussion of these
important topics and their various implications. Would you please join me in a
moment of prayer and dedication? [A Brief Prayer]
We will now begin the day's conversation with an introduction by Governor
William Winter. Governor Winter, you have the floor. Thank you for being here.
Governor Winter: Thank you very much. I am indeed, honored by being invited
to speak to you today. This is an honored occasion and an honored place as well.
As Andy has pointed out, President Andrew Jackson stood and addressed an
assembly in this building. The Secession Convention in 1861 was held right here,
as was a later Constitutional Convention. And, importantly from my point of view,
it was in this very place that I was inaugurated Governor. [Laughter]
I cannot think of a more timely or appropriate subject, but before I get started, let
me make something clear. If I say anything this morning that is out-of-line, just
blame it on Andy Gipson. [Laughter] When I asked him what issues he wanted
me to address, he said, "You say whatever you want to say, just don't take too long
to say it." [Laughter]
So with that in mind, let me make it very clear that I believe we have a wonderful
and highly competent judiciary in this State. I want to pay my respects to the judiciary of Mississippi. I have been a lawyer for over fifty years in Mississippi, and
we have been fortunate in my opinion to have had a judiciary of honor and good
will.
We have one now, and we have had one in the past. Most judges who have served
have found it to be a sacrifice. But despite that very admirable record, I believe that
in light of recent developments, it is time for us to at least take a look at the process
ofjudicial selection. And I believe that many of those who hold seats in the judiciary would welcome that suggestion.
Let me suggest three reasons, (and in my opinion, very good reasons) for taking
a second look at the process of electing our judiciary.
The first reason is the incredible increase in the cost of campaigning. This is a
recent development. It is not unusual for a judicial candidate to spend a quarter of a
million dollars or more just running for office. I am told the process of raising that
kind of money is not undertaken by the candidates themselves, but I think all of us
would be very naYve to think those who are running are not very much aware of
who their major contributors are.
Secondly, as the cost of campaign continues to mount, there will be an ongoing
threat to the independence and integrity of courts. No candidate should ever conduct an election on the basis of how he or she would rule in a given case, and no
judge should ever have to give up his independence in making decisions because of
the fear of political reprisal. It is one thing that governors and legislators have to
deal with this problem, but its quite another for a judge to have to.
And finally, and paradoxically, despite the huge amounts of money spent on judicial campaigns in presenting themselves to the voters, I have found there is an
appalling lack of knowledge by the voters of our State as to the candidates who are
running for judicial positions. A little over a year ago, before the election in
November 2000, I attended a dinner party and in the course of the conversation I
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inquired of those who were there, who they were supporting for the Supreme
Court. Now these were normally well-informed citizens who feel more than a passing interest in the things of public interest. I will tell you, of the 8-10 people who
were there that night, not a single one knew anything about any of the four candidates who were then running for the two Supreme Court seats for the northern district.
Well, seeing that there are no perfect solutions for this problem, I do suggest that
continuing thought be given to a systematic effect in many states, where for each
judicial position, a broad-based non-partisan nominating committee screens and
recommends several nominees to the governor, who then appoints the nominees to
fill positions on that basis. This process could then be subject to confirmation...
subject to confirmation or approval by the electorate every 6 years or so.
Whether we realize it or not, we already have a great many judges who are
appointed. The Governor just within the last few days appointed two members of
the Supreme Court, and two circuit judges. When I was Governor, I appointed
between 16-20 men and women to various judicial positions, including two to the
Supreme Court. That's about par for the course, every governor appoints 15-20
judges. I thought it was important that there be developed a process of judicial
selection that would attract as many dedicated, qualified, competent people that we
could get into our judiciary, while at the same time taking me as Governor off the
hook to some extent. [Laughter]
And so with the indispensable support from the young lawyers section of the bar
association, we established an executive order that created a Judicial Nominating
Committee. The Committee was composed as follows: three members of the
Supreme Court appointed by the Governor, from each Supreme Court district,
three appointed by the president of the state bar association or a committee of the
state bar, and three other members - nine altogether, with the goal of representing
the broad interests and ideals across the board.
Not all the committee members were lawyers. The chair was appointed by the
Governor.
Within that committee, there were subcommittees to address the situations when
there was a circuit or chancery court judge opening. Committee members for the
district in which that court sat took nominations, applications, and recommendations from a wide range of people. These applicants expressed their qualifications
in a very detailed application that was filled out citing the experience of the applicant. The committee would then interview the applicants and arrive at a list of the
three names from which the governor could make an appointment based on the
nominees' qualifications.
The same process applied to the Supreme Court, except the whole judicial nominating committee met on those nominations and gave the governor a list of 5
names.
I think that nominating process worked very well. I know that it greatly reduced
the political pressure of the governor to appoint some of his special friends. Out of
that process came a system that we could look to as a permanent process of making
judicial appointments, should we go to a broader based system of appointments
rather than just having it apply on each of the vacancies to be filled.
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Let me close these remarks by saying two or three things.
Our diverse society, particularly, the pressure-filled society that we live in now,
needs all the help it can get from its wisest and most sensitive and receptive members to keep it functioning smoothly. I suggest that we must continue to look to
those who are commissioned, officially commissioned, to make wise decisions
about judicial matters to keep things calm and rational. At times in the past we
have not always made the wisest decisions in times of crisis, when feelings ran
high, and we paid a price.
John Dewey said, "Judges not only live in their own generation, but they participate in a vision of the future."
That, it seems to me, states the ultimate challenge and ultimate responsibility that
we face.
As a member of the Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit has said "Judges not
only have the opportunity, but the duty to speak always for the highest moral values
of our society, and when they do not do that, they diminish their authority."
It is this role of moral and ethical leadership that the members of the judiciary
and the bar must continue to fill if our state and our country can overcome the
remaining barriers of economic inequity and social neglect.
While a virtuous society cannot be mandated, a base and uncaring society can
certainly be discouraged. And that is the judicial legacy and responsibility that
should inspire us all if we strive to achieve the kind of state and country that we
would want our children and grandchildren to inherit.
Thank you very much. [Applause]
Andy Gipson: Thank you so much Governor. Next we are going to seat a panel
to discuss the current system of judicial selection in Mississippi. This panel will be
composed of the Honorable Fred Banks, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, Jim
Kitchens, and Leslie Scott, and will be moderated by Professor Jeffrey Jackson.
Well, are you ready Professor Jackson? You now have the floor.
Professor Jackson: I am Jeff Jackson, and I am pleased to be here and on this
panel. I just wanted to make some opening remarks. There is a concern sometimes
when you talk about an issue such as judicial selection that there be balance or fairness. It's a privilege for me to be on this panel with [the other panelists]. Now to
demonstrate our commitment to balance, I am here to really represent mediocrity.
[Laughter] So those of you who are concerned that we be fair, I am really here to
provide that perspective.
Now there has been some suggestion that we may have questions ... if we have
time. We certainly will reserve some time for questions. I know there are many
law students here who may be asking questions, and I am sure you are all prepared
for that.
I was looking at a study published in a paper just a couple of years ago. Now
everybody knows that here in Mississippi, we elect our judges, although a number
of our judges who have come to the bench have been appointed. Chief Justice
Lenore Prather, for example, was appointed to every judicial position she held, and
never faced an opponent until last year. So we have a number of judges who are
appointed and never go through a contested election.
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These statistics that are now a couple of years old state that 39 states have chosen
to have their appellate judges face some kind of election. Forty-seven percent are
permanent elections; 40% face partisan elections and 13% face non-partisan elections.
Now trial judges, the judges of the courts of general jurisdiction, usually have
initial term elections nationwide. Twenty-four percent are permanent, 43% face
partisan elections, and 43% face non-partisan elections.
Now if you look at subsequent terms, 87% of state appellate trial judges face
elections.
Now these statistics do not mean we can't do a better job with the judicial selection process. And whether we choose to go away from the electoral process or
whether we do not, I think we can all agree that we need to do the best job we can.
It seems that however we select judges, we need to find the best way possible to
attract the kind of judges that Governor Winter has just spoken about.
Today I am going to allow the panelists to talk a little bit about our current system if you will, how judges are selected in Mississippi, and in that context, to discuss various issues.
As many of you know in the most recent judicial elections there was some controversy about contributions and disclosure.
Take some time to discuss, Ms. Scott, the law in Mississippi regarding campaign
contributions in the context ofjudicial elections.
Leslie Scott: Thank you. We have a law in Mississippi that does provide for limits in contributions in cases of judicial candidates and on disclosures to be filed
with circuit courts. These laws are intended to ensure that information be made
public and to encourage debate among the public about issues relevant to the candidates and the elections of judicial candidates. Essentially, in the judicial arena
our law places campaign contribution limits of 5,000 dollars for Supreme Court
and Mississippi Court of Appeals candidates. These limits apply to entities and
individuals in the political communities.
For judges other than that, our circuit, chancery, and county court judges, the
limits for contributions to those candidates are 500 dollars. And then there are general contribution limits of 1000 dollars per calendar year by any corporation to any
candidate. In Mississippi, there is a method to fine candidates in committees that
fail to report in a timely manner as set out in the statute.
Last year we did encounter some controversy surrounding our statute, particularly in regard to what the statute describes as 'independent expenditures.' These are
not contributions, they are not made to the candidates - they are made by independent third parties. Last year as you remember, we faced an onslaught of media
campaigning in favor of certain candidates. This media campaign was sponsored
by the United States Chamber of Commerce, and the amount of contributions were
not filed.
It was the position of the State of Mississippi that those who are making independent expenditures have the potential to negatively impact all areas of the campaign. There is a case pending in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which was
argued before the Court of Appeals Tuesday.
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Professor Jackson: Now is this the only case the State is involved in, or are there
other cases? I know that other cases were being filed with regard to this same
issue.
Leslie Scott: The Secretary of State was not involved in those cases, it was private litigation and the Secretary's position was that he had tools available to him
under the campaign finance statute to essentially enforce the requirement that they
file, and we were on the verge of attempting to do that when the Chamber initiated
its own court action in federal court.
Professor Jackson: Thank you. Now Justice Banks, you were on the Supreme
Court for some time. It has been reported that some campaigns have incurred
costs up to a quarter of a million dollars. That seems a lot of money for a position
on the Supreme Court. What are your thoughts on the costs - and increased costs
- of campaigning for these positions?
Justice Banks: Well, you first have to understand that the elections here in
Mississippi are tied to specific districts. In many states, the Supreme Court is run
state wide. And you can't really compare expenditures in large districts with those
in smaller districts, where the area is small enough to enable the candidate to conduct a more cost-efficient campaign. The districts are essentially larger than they
used to be.
In 1991, for example, my campaign cost around 150,000 dollars. By 1996 it was
bumped up to about a quarter of a million.
So you can see that a number of changes caused the increased cost - the district
size changes, and there has been the change on the political level. The trial lawyers
have recently expanded their efforts on the campaign level, beginning sometime
around 1996.
Professor Jackson: Would you like to see us stay with the current size of districts, or would you prefer to decrease the district sizes, or go to a statewide electoral system?
Justice Banks: Well, I'm not sure that what I'd like is a good guide. [Laughter]
But I believe that the system we have now provides districts that are large enough
to ensure that the electorate are informed about the candidates. The system has
broad influence and broad appeal, and I think that it's necessary to tinker with the
districts.
Professor Jackson: Regarding the legitimacy of contributions, we don't currently
have restraints on expenditures. We do have restraints on what you can give directly
to a candidate.
We don't have restraints on what you can spend on behalf of a candidate. Should
we consider, and could it be constitutional to impose limits on not only contributions, but expenditures?
Professor Chemerinsky, could you answer that question for us?
Professor Chemerinsky: Let me start by saying what a pleasure it is to be here
today. I must also say I am a bit sheepish being on a panel talking about the current
Mississippi system. Being a law professor, I can almost hear the citizens saying,
"All the arrogance of that law professor, coming from Los Angeles, being in
Mississippi for less than 12 hours, and proposing to comment on the Mississippi
system." [Laughter]
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But one thing that I maybe can talk about a little bit is the Constitutional framework for analyzing the questions we are talking about now regarding judicial elections.
The constitutional framework comes to us from the 1976 U.S. Supreme Court
case Buckley v. Valeo.
Congress, in response to the corruption exposed in the Watergate scandal,
amended the Federal Election Act to do four things.
First, it imposed contribution limits on the amount of money that could be given
to candidates for Federal office, or to committees for candidates for Federal office.
Second, it imposed expenditure limits, limiting the amount that any one person
can spend on the effort.
Third, it imposed strict disclosure requirements. It imposed requirements that
candidates disclose who their contributors were, and what they contributed to a
candidate.
And fourth, it created a system for public funding for Presidential and Vice
Presidential elections, and said that candidates that choose to take public money
must limit the amount they can spend.
Let me take what Buckley said about each of those and apply them to judicial
elections, what we're talking about.
First, Buckley said that contribution limits are Constitutional. Buckley said that
large contributions inherently risk corruption and the appearance of corruption.
So even though Buckley said that spending money on an election campaign is
speech protected by the First Amendment, it also said that strict scrutiny is best in
restricting contributions. The Supreme Court has made it clear that it is largely up
to the political process to decide the size of the contribution limits. A year ago, in
2000, in the Nixon case the Supreme Court reaffirmed that contribution limits are
permissible, even if they're significant contribution limits.
The Nixon case involved a Missouri statute limiting the size of the contribution
to candidates of state office to $1,000 contributions for state-wide offices in general, down to $250 per candidate for other positions.
The Supreme Court in a 6-3 decision with a majority opinion written by Justice
Souter reaffirmed Buckley that contribution limits are permissible. The Court said
it wasn't going to get into the business of deciding where to draw the line between
whether it is to small or too big, but would leave that up to the political process.
So as I have listened here this morning to decide the contribution limits for judical elections in Mississippi, I have no doubt that Buckley through Nixon would
permit contribution limits.
The second part of what the Court said in Buckley is that expenditure limits are
unconstitutional. The Government cannot limit the amount that a person chooses
to spend on behalf of a candidate or the amount that a candidate spends on himself
or herself, because the Court said that large expenditures carry less of a risk of corruption. Less of a sense of a quid pro quo expenditure.
The Court said where expenditures are restricted, there is a greater limit on
speech, so that limiting how much is spent regarding an election campaign inherently is restricting what is said with regard to an election campaign. The Supreme
Court has consistently reaffirmed that expenditure limits are unconstitutional.
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Now I believe and I have argued in a law review article this should be reconsidered with regard to judicial elections. There has never been expenditure limits as to
judicial elections that has been ruled on by the Supreme Court.
And just a few words here. As you've already heard this morning, the costs of
running for judge are skyrocketing. I recently talked to someone who wants to run
for trial judge in Southern California. He said that he was going to need to raise
one million to two million dollars. I wouldn't know how to raise a million or two
million dollars if my life depended on it. And I am a unique one among law professors; I've actually run for public office. I ran for a city commission to revise the
city charter and did some fund-raising. But a million or two million dollars to be a
trial judge? When you look around the country at the amount that is being raised
in Texas, in Alabama, in Ohio, and every year it gets more and its well into the millions of dollars. With the 50 million dollars that Bloomberg just spent of his own
money to become mayor of New York, there's reason to see that judicial elections
will ever increase.
And many studies have shown, the person who spends the most money has a
greater chance of winning. In judicial elections this is more likely to be so because
people are unfamiliar with the candidates. Maybe they're unfamiliar with candidates for all offices, but especially this is true for judicial elections. So money,
which buys name recognition, is so much more likely to have an effect. Money,
even though its expenditures, inherently is likely to affect the process. I recently
had the opportunity of speaking upon this topic, and a very respected trial judge
from California came to me and said that the topic of conversation in the judge's
lunch room is about which law firms will give the most money to guard a judge's
election campaign, and then the judge goes out on the bench, and appears in a
hearing with that law firm. Now the judge isn't allowed to personally solicit the
money. It's done through committee. But of course, judges are going to know
who's giving money, and who is not. The reality is that money in judicial campaigns come from the law firms and litigants who appear before the judges.
When you see the effect of this in places like Texas, you look at Chief Justice
Phillips who has money coming from oil companies and the insurance industry;
and you look at where Alabama and Ohio judges get their money from, I don't
know about you, but I wouldn't want to go before the Texas Supreme Court suing
the oil industry or the insurance industry knowing that that is where the justices are
getting their money from.
So inherently large expenditures do risk corruption and the appearance of corruption in undermining the independence of the judiciary. So I'd argue that even
though expenditure limits are generally not allowed, they should be allowed in judicial election campaigns.
The third thing that Buckley said was that disclosure requirements are permissible. That it can be required that candidates disclose all groups they receive money
from; committees for candidates disclose who they receive money from; and those
who give money to candidates campaigns disclose. I think that this should be especially enforced in regard to judicial elections. I hope that the Fifth Circuit will in
the case involving Mississippi extend that to independent expenditures.
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And finally, the Supreme Court in Buckley said that public financing of elections
is permissible and with it there can be, on those that take public money, limits on
how much they spend. I would like to see us go to a system of public funding of
judicial elections, to limit corruption and the appearance of corruption. I certainly
believe that election of judges is here to stay. Rarely are people going to vote themselves out of power. I prefer a merit selection system as the governor discussed in
his introduction, but so long as we have some form of judicial elections, I think this
is the ideal place for a system of public funding.
Professor Jackson: Thank you. Let me ask you, since Buckley v. Valeo did
declare expenditure limits unconstitutional in that context, what really distinguishes a judicial election from perhaps, a presidential election or congressional election.. .what distinguishes.. .in your mind, what distinguishes the judicial office that
would allow these kinds of limits in this area although they would be unconstitutional in others?
Professor Chemerinsky: The point of the judicial process is that you want judges
deciding cases before them solely on their perception of the merits. We don't allow
lobbying of judges. We don't allow the same kinds of things that otherwise are tolerated in the political process. We're glad to accept, grudgingly, that elected representatives are going to be influenced by those that give money to them. But I don't
think that we're glad to accept the idea that judges are going to be influenced by
those that give money to them. So I think the nature of what we want judges to be
doing as opposed to what we want other elected officials to be doing, the way we
want to exclude any outside influence from judges, but are willing to tolerate it for
other elected officials, that to me justifies expenditure limits as justly permissible
even though they are not for other elected officials.
Professor Jackson: Mr. Kitchens, I believe that you had some useful thoughts on
contributions and expenditures as to how it might be handled better. We're all concerned ... I think everyone would agree that we need an independent judiciary. We
need a judiciary that's not influenced by outside influence on how it decides cases.
What are your thoughts on contributions or expenditures as to how this might be
handled in this process?
Jim Kitchens: First, I would like to join with you in welcoming Professor
Chemerinsky to Mississippi and offer to him that at the conclusion of this program
I would like to take him down to Copiah county, we're I'd like to register him to
vote, because I'm sure he's been here long enough. [Laughter]
I agree with those who have said that election of judges is probably here to stay. I
don't think that's a right that many people in Mississippi are willing to give up. The
right to vote has been hard won in Mississippi by a large segment of our population. When I started practicing law in 1967, two phenomenal things were happening that got all the older lawyers' attention. And that was, first, that women were
beginning to serve on juries in Mississippi. Second, African-Americans were
beginning to serve on juries in Mississippi, and only as a result of a long struggle
that culminated in the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which did more to change this
State for the better than anything that I can remember in my lifetime. The jurors, of
course, come from the voting rolls, and African-Americans had been disenfran-
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chised in this state until that time - until the mid to late 60's. So when they were
allowed to vote, they were allowed to serve on juries, and that has improved our
court systems enormously. Then we began to elect African-American judges, and
some of the more forward-thinking leaders we have had, such as my friend and my
idol, Governor Winter, had the foresight and wisdom and sense of justice to
appoint African-Americans and women to the courts. So, I don't think that our people are willing to forego that right. I don't think that the people of this state are
willing to give up such a valuable right as selecting their own judges. So the problem is here to stay.
Having said that, judges are going to have to run for office, and campaigns are
going to have to be funded. I like that idea about public funding. I'm not sure that
would fly in Mississippi. But, I have some ideas that I will provide at this time.
Governor Winter alluded to this problem, and that is that even though, theoretically,
judges are not supposed to know who gave them money, it is rather easy for them
to find that out if they want to. Of course there's public reporting, and all the judge
has to do, is get someone to go over and check the contributions and find out who
gave money to the campaign. We'd all like to think that our judges are above that,
and wouldn't do that; that people who had contributed are above that, and wouldn't
try to disclose that. But I don't think we're naive enough to think that is the case.
So, I think that we ought to consider a system that would be something like this:
Set up a mechanism in the state for blind contributions that would be as foolproof
as we could make it. There's always going be holes someplace, but close the holes
up as tight as we can. And have some entity - the one that comes to my mind, and
the most logical entity is the Mississippi Bar. Set up a mechanism in the
Mississippi Bar where you have something - you might call a judicial campaign
fund, or a judicial campaign account - much like a trust account that lawyers have
in the law office. And allow me if I want to contribute to Chief Justice Pittman's
campaign or whoever else may be running for judicial office in this state, that I
send my check to the judicial campaign fund care of the state bar. And I send a letter to them, and I say please credit this to the campaign fund of Chief Justice
Pittman or Justice Cobb or whoever I think we should contribute to. And then the
bar sends its check from its trust account, if you will, to the campaign committee
of that candidate. Make it a crime for a judge, for a judicial candidate, for a lawyer,
for any citizen to try to ascertain who has contributed to those campaigns. If I send
a check to someone's campaign, I should be prohibited by law, and punished criminally if I am found to be in violation of this law, and let that person know that I
contributed to his or her campaign. A similar sanction should apply to the recipients of those funds. I think that it would easy to implement. I think it would be
inexpensive to implement. And, it would go a long way toward getting around the
problem of judicial awareness of their contributors.
That's my idea, Professor Jackson. I might say that I'm very honored to be sitting
at the left hand of mediocrity. If Professor Jackson is mediocre, then mediocrity
has risen to a new level.
Professor Jackson: I thank you for that last comment certainly. Ms. Scott, in the
current statutory framework if we were to have a proposal that we would allow the
bar, to have contributions sent to the bar, how would that work in the current regulatory framework?
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Leslie Scott: I think that there would be two comments I could make on that.
One is that the bar, or whoever the entity is, would certainly want to be cognizant
of the contribution levels that are currently in the law and actively monitoring that
kind of the thing. The law would have to be followed.
Secondly, I think there is the issue of reporting that would come up in the current
campaign finance law scheme. There has to be disclosure by some entity of contributions, and I think that the bar or whatever the entity should be might become
important in that they would need to file both contributions in and expenditures
out, like the current set up is provided for in Mississippi. And our office, while I
certainly think that we would support things that try to remove influence and things
of that kind, I think our office has always been very supportive of disclosure, and
that's how the law came about, and the position I feel that we could continue to
take with regard to reporting requirements and the like.
Professor Jackson: So, in the current regulatory environment, if I sent a thousand dollar check to the bar to go to Justice Banks, they would have to report that
they had received a thousand dollars from me?
Leslie Scott: From you.
Professor Jackson: Would they have to report it in the current regulatory environment when the expenditure is made by Justice Banks?
Leslie Scott: When the expenditure is made, I think it would have to be tied back
to the contribution. The problem is that it's a middle person, and I think that middle
person would be a committee that would have to report expenditures.
Jim Kitchens: My suggestion would contemplate a provision in the state law to
accommodate that necessity.
Professor Jackson: So if we were to think about this kind of proposal we would
need some type of disclosure. Mr. Chemerinsky, what do you think about that proposal of Mr. Kitchens?
Professor Chemerinsky: With all due respect, which means you know I'm going
to disagree, it's based on the idea that secrecy is better than the openness, and it's
hard to ever imagine a circumstance where that is so.
There are two reasons why I would have problems with it. One is it deprives people of important information about the candidate. I think one way in which we
should evaluate a candidate is based on who's supporting them. That, if I know, for
example, the trial lawyers are behind a particular candidate, that might effect how
I'd evaluate a candidate. If I know the insurance industry is behind a candidate, that
might effect how I'd evaluate a candidate. If I know a racist group is giving money
to a candidate, I'd want that to be out in the open, and that would effect how I'd
evaluate a candidate. It does give useful information, and secret expenditures will
allow a group that for whatever reason didn't want the public to know, to hide
behind that veil.
And, second, I'm concerned that it wouldn't really eliminate the influence that
money has on judges. Now, formally, this has to be secret under the proposal. Mr.
Kitchens says he would have a criminal law that prevents anyone from trying to
find out. But there's no way of stopping informal complications. There's no way to
prevent the contributor from saying to the judge or judicial candidate or the person
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running for judge or a judicial candidate, "You know I just sent a check to the
secret fund for you" or "I just want you to know that I'm a big supporter of yours
and I'm going to take care of sending a check there for you." So, you still have the
judge or the judicial candidate through a committee and all legal mechanisms
needing to raise money, and indirectly finding out. So I don't think you're eliminating the negative effects of money, but you are eliminating the positive benefits of
disclosure, and I have reservations about such a proposal.
Professor Jackson: So you would limit the way they spend, but not allow them to
keep contributions in secrecy?
Professor Chemerinsky: Right, I think that I'd much rather have whatever was
going on go out in the sunshine.
Professor Jackson: Mr. Kitchens?
Jim Kitchens: Well, if we're looking to - if our quest is for a perfect system without any flaws, we'd might as well go home. But I certainly recognize what you say,
Professor Chemerinsky, and I agree in part, but if we're merely wanting to limit
contributions, that is so easy to circumvent. We could have a limit on contributions
and I want to give more than that. And, I'm not an unethical person, I'm not the
kind of person that would go and whisper to a judge and say that I just sent a check
to your secret fund. But those people are out there, and they're always going to be
out there. Then you're not going to solve the problem by limiting the amount of
contributions. All I'd have to do is go find somebody else, and give them some
cash and say, "Here, send your check to judge so-and-so's fund." And I could do
that as many times as I could find other unscrupulous people. So, we've got to look
at it the best way we can to try to find solutions to the current problem. Obviously,
none of us want to see a repeat of what we saw last year. We've not yet addressed
the problem with groups like the U. S. Chamber of Commerce coming in, and third
parties coming in, as it were, and spending money, with or without the candidate's
permission. So, we've got a huge task here, and I think that the blind contribution
thought is something certainly worth considering as a trade-off. To do something
like that you would lose disclosure, you would lose the sunshine effect, by taking
everything out of the light of day. But, if it's out in the light of day, the judges are
going to be the ones that are most interested in looking at it.
Professor Jackson: Justice Banks, let me ask you to comment on this as a practical matter, and also what are your thoughts as to expenditure limits?
Justice Banks: People won't make contributions without solicitation. And you've
got to know who to ask. And somebody in a judge's campaign has to ask for contributions, and has to know that the contributions been made so that they will stop
asking. So that information is there and available to the judges and the only people
who do not benefit from that system is the public. That's the flaw as I see it. You
asked me another question?
Professor Jackson: I asked you also as a matter of policy, do you think having
expenditure limits would be helpful?
Justice Banks: It's worth exploring. I don't quite know how we would set a limit
that would apply to every campaign.
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Professor Jackson: Talk to us about the proposed recusal rule. Under what circumstances would a judge be recused? I understand we have now a proposed
peremptory challenge, which is unrelated to campaign finance, but we also have a
recusal in cases where a judge received contributions by a litigant?
Justice Banks: There is a required recusal in the case where the litigant or the
lawyer is a major donor to the judge's campaign that may be waived by the party
opposite.
Professor Jackson: So there's a process for the disqualification of a judge whose
impartiality might be questioned due to contributions. Professor Chemerinsky, you
have commented on this proposal already in print. I wonder if you would share
your views on that particular proposal.
Professor Chemerinsky: I support it. Given the current system for funding elections, I think that it is the way best assuring the appearance of fairness and preventing the appearance of corruption. This is something that is not only in Mississippi,
but it is across the country because it was proposed in an ABA study that Professor
Jackson mentioned.
Professor Jackson: Now, is the idea though, if I have a judge that's killing me in,
well, let's pick a county - maybe Jefferson county -just off the top of my head. Is it
the idea that if I contribute $5,000 to his campaign I can be sure that I can recuse
him?
Justice Banks: It won't work that way.
Professor Jackson: I can't buy my peace for $5,000?
Justice Banks: It won't work that way because the other side can unrecuse him
through waiver.
Professor Jackson: Oh, the other side can unrecuse him. Okay.
Justice Banks: The flaw is that it does not speak to contributions to the judge's
opponent. So, contributing to the judge's opponent has no effect on the judge's
required recusal. You're not required to recuse yourself in a case involving a person
who has contributed in a major way to your opponent.
Professor Jackson: Mr. Kitchens, what's your view on the proposed recusal based
on financial contributions?
Jim Kitchens: I think that it's well intentioned and it's a step in the right direction.
The thing that occurs to me about it is once again it's easy to circumvent. As I
understand it, it applies to - this is a per lawyer contribution in the case of the
members of the bar. You can take a law firm that has a hundred lawyers in it and
everybody in the firm can contribute $2499 under the limit and you don't have a
problem and there's not a recusal problem. Then, somebody else - maybe in a
small, one man, one woman law firm contributes $2500, only $2500, whereas you
have a much larger amount coming from a large firm, which tend to be the firms
that represent the insurance companies and big businesses. And so, they could get a
lot of money without having a recusal problem, and a small firm practitioner might
give the limit and have a problem.
Professor Jackson: That issue of unbundling funds, if I have a firm, and I give
my secretary funds and she's going to give it to a judicial candidate - it seems like
in federal elections sometimes you bundle funds, but in judicial elections you
unbundle them. Ms. Scott, let me ask you, what is the enforcement for contribution
limits under the authority of the Secretary of State's office?
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Leslie Scott: The Secretary of State's office was not given a great deal of authority other than our administrative role, which I alluded to, which is a penalizing and
fining authority for people who don't file at all. We were not given any role of
investigation into complaints or factual allegations made to us along the lines of
what you described, nor were we given any authority to take action when those situations arose, other than reporting to the A.G.'s office.
Professor Jackson: Are there any penalties if I violate any contribution limits?
Leslie Scott: Yes. There are penalties. The penalty statute reads that there has to
be "a willful, deliberate, and substantial violation" of any of the campaign finance
laws to constitute the misdemeanor offense, and then there is fine of I believe
$3,000 or 6 months in jail or both. And that is something that we have done in
terms of my experience in the elections division when we get a report of a violation, we are making a referral of that matter to the Attorney General's office for the
consideration, investigation, and prosecution if appropriate. It is also subject to
prosecution by the local district attorneys or other local prosecuting parties.
Professor Jackson: Do you know if the current law would support attribution of
limits? In other words, if my secretary gives money, and I give money, which
together would exceed the limit, is there an attribution provision in the law that
would attribute those funds to me?
Leslie Scott: There's nothing that specifically addresses the scheme that you're
describing, but I think clearly the scheme would subject a person involved, or persons involved, to a possible violation of the law. Because what is looked over is
what's disclosed by the candidate, and if the real donor is not the person whose
name is coming in, but rather it's being funneled from somewhere else, I think
there's a potential violation there. But our statute does not specifically address that
scheme. I think that's a common allegation, and something that, if proven, we
would suggest that it be referred for possible prosecution to the proper prosecuting
authorities.
Professor Jackson: Thank you. We're coming to end of our time, but, are there
any questions from our audience? Professor McIntosh.
Professor McIntosh: Yes. Even if there are expenditure limits, how would you
address third-party spending?
Professor Chemerinsky: The question is if there's going to be expenditure limits,
how do you deal with third parties spending outside of the specific campaign? Of
course, here you get into the problem of what if they're speaking about the issues
of the campaign? I think that it is clearly identified whether they're supporting or
not supporting a candidate, but without making it explicit that they are doing so.
That is something that Congress is trying to deal with generally with regard to
campaign funding.
I think that the way to deal with this is by rules that define what we mean by an
expenditure for a particular candidate. And my answer is, as so often in the law, the
reasonable person standard. If the reasonable person would view the ad as supporting a particular candidate, or opposing a candidate, then it should be considered
towards the expenditure limit. I don't want to limit what people can say about
issues, but if it is for or against a specific candidate, then the expenditure should be
considered as such.
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Professor Jackson: I think we have time for one more question. Sir?
[Question from the floor]
Professor Chemerinsky: How did we get here, and would Buckley cause more
problems in the South? Let me address the latter point: Could Buckley bring more
problems to the South? Because I think to try to do the history would be much
harder and no short answer. It all depends on your perspective about Buckley.
Some believe that Buckley got it exactly right drawing the distinction between
contributions and expenditures that it did. And there are five justices on the current
Court who would say that Buckley got it right. Some believe that Buckley got it
wrong; that expenditure limits should be allowed just as contribution limits are
allowed. Justice Stevens, on the current court, takes that position. He says there's
nothing different between a large expenditure and a large contribution. The candidate's going to know that the money's spent, so it's the same danger of corruption
and the appearance of corruption. On the other hand, there are some who believe
that Buckley got it wrong and that contribution limits should be unconstitutional,
just like expenditure limits are unconstitutional. Three justices on the current
Court, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy, take that position. They think that any
restriction on contributions is also unconstitutional. So, whether you think that
Buckley made it worse or made it better is a matter of perspective. One thing's for
sure, Buckley began to change the nature of how campaign funding is done.
Because of Buckley, we have all the political action committees at the local, state,
and federal level of elections. It's an open question if that is a good or a bad way
for elections.
Professor Jackson: We are at the end of our time. Ms. Scott, Mr. Kitchens,
Professor Chemerinsky, and Justice Banks, I thank you. We're going to take a brief
break before the next presentation. Perhaps as much as five minutes.

